Guest Column: Naval Academy Honor Concept strays from roots

Most of the other studies and reports conducted to date either focus on issues pertaining to specific aspects of the honor system at the particular time they were written or were strictly historical accounts of events. These studies are of little value in finding real solutions, however, because they fail to recognize the long-term trends of the different approaches that have been taken towards the moral development of midshipmen.

Presently at the Naval Academy, a great deal of energy is spent spurring the midshipmen to conform to the Academy’s customs (i.e. regulations, policies, etc.). However, unless the midshipmen first adopt the basic ethical values on which the Navy is founded, such efforts will be met with little success. 

Origins and Development of the Honor Concept: Decades of Inconsistency  

Historical evidence clearly reveals that there has never been an extended period of time when the process of turning midshipmen into officers was a simple or straightforward task. The idea that there were ever "good ol’ days" in regard to moral development at the Naval Academy is rooted more in old movies, books, and folklore than in fact. Whether it was hazing, "gouging" (cheating), sexual harassment, or conspiratorial lying, nearly every generation at the Academy has had its challenges.

Practically all of the problems with the Naval Academy's current honor system stem from a misunderstanding and miscommunication about what it actually is and how it works. The Naval Academy's honor system is referred to as the “Honor Concept,” and most midshipmen understand the Honor Concept to be the following statement: 

• Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They stand for that which is right.
• They tell the truth and ensure that the full truth is known. They do not lie.
• They embrace fairness in all actions. They ensure that work submitted as their own is their own, and that assistance received from any source is authorized and properly documented. They do not cheat.
• They respect the property of others and ensure that others are able to benefit from the use of their own property. They do not steal.1

There is also a set of administrative procedures contained in a 90-page Naval Academy Instruction for handling honor cases, which is also referred to as the Honor Concept. Much confusion arises simply from the fact that the same term is used to describe two different things. While nearly every similar program in the country describes itself as a “code,” the Academy’s use of the word “concept” is intentional. To understand why, we have to look back to the early 1950s.

Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill became Superintendent of the Naval Academy in 1950. While serving as a battalion officer in the 1930s, Admiral Hill had attempted, but failed, to establish an official honor system. As Superintendent, he was determined to continue his earlier work to create a successful and viable program.2 Indeed, the timing was perfect because, almost simultaneously with his arrival, a group of midshipmen had come together to try to abolish a long-accepted form of cheating at the Academy, called "doping" or “gouging.” (Exam questions were passed by midshipmen in morning exam sessions to midshipmen in afternoon sessions.) 3 Working closely with Admiral Hill, this group of midshipmen, which included Perot and the future Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, developed and implemented a system so far ahead of its time that, to this day, there is nothing like it in operation.

Admiral Hill did not want to develop a system similar to the strict Honor Code at West Point, which included a specifically defined set of codified actions that constituted honor violations. His fear was that such an approach would be vulnerable to loopholes that could be used to circumvent the system or "sea lawyer" one’s way out of trouble. 4 The midshipmen agreed. Admiral J. M. Boorda also recognized the importance of this idea in his 1990 review of the honor system: 

• The Concept cannot be cheapened by "gaming" or legalistic diversions from its basic intent...We need to move away from a heavy emphasis on training in the administration and operation of the Honor Concept and back to the ethical reasons for the Concept itself. 5

In addition, Admiral Hill wanted to avoid the establishment of a system that operated on fear or the threat of punishment. He wanted a system that fostered the cultivation of a strong moral character, not one that coerced compliance. Most important, however, he believed that if such a system was going to have any real chance of success, every midshipman in the Brigade would have to feel personally responsible for its maintenance. To achieve this, he instructed the group of midshipmen to design the system and then sent the final version to a Brigade-wide vote. 6 It is unlikely however, that Admiral Hill came up with the idea of involving the midshipmen to this extent on his own, as seen in Midshipman H. Ross Perot’s research.

In 1953, Midshipman Perot did a great deal of research into the history of honor at the Academy. As part of his research he wrote letters to class presidents from as far back as the class of 1898, asking them how the topic of honor was dealt with during their time as midshipmen. The responses from the class presidents from 1904-1916 indicated that the importance of what is now referred to as “midshipmen ownership” was common knowledge during this era. (Admiral Hill had been a member of the class of 1911.) The following are excerpts from some of these letters: 

• Authorization by the class is a necessary preliminary. 7
• Each Class was told to discuss the matter in a class meeting and to report to the Commandant accepting or rejecting an "honor" system for exams by which classmates would be under obligation without reprisal, to report any observed infraction of fair behavior. 8 
• The Class of 1907 accepted the honor system as propounded by the Superintendent through the Commandant of Midshipmen. 9
• This code of honor was established entirely on the initiative of the class members without hint or participation by the authorities. There was never any announcement of this action taken in secret session by the class. 10
• The more flagrant cases of misconduct (unknown to the Academy authorities and so not handled by them) coming to the attention of a class president were dealt with by the class as a whole in a class meeting held in secret session. 11
• If we had a case, we would have had a secret session with the [class president, presiding without a vote, to examine the case and if unanimous in a decision of guilt, the midshipman would be asked to resign for personal family reasons at home and thereby get a fresh start without taint or shadow. 12

In response to the Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident of 1992, Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton ordered a review of the Naval Academy and its honor system. The reviewing panel was led by Richard Armitage and its findings and recommendations are contained in a report commonly known as the “Armitage Report.” If we compare the above excerpts to an opinion expressed in the Armitage Report, we find a very similar idea: 

• It is clear that confidence in the Honor Concept cannot be forced down from above. The Brigade itself must believe in, must operate, and within necessary legal constraints, must own the Honor Concept. The Honor Concept must be their property and their means of developing character within their own ranks and by their own efforts, if it is to succeed. 13

Admiral Hill must have recognized the pitfalls of the secretive and clandestine approach used in the early 1900s. Without guidance, it was possible for midshipmen to develop standards of honor that were inconsistent with those intended by Academy officials. The following letter to Perot from the president of the class of 1916 gives an example of this: 

• By our cockeyed code it was right for midshipmen who were "unsat" or barely "sat" to use stolen examinations but dead wrong for those who were comfortably "sat." 14

The 1915 "White Slips" cheating affair, which occurred shortly after Admiral Hill graduated and involved over three quarters of the entire Brigade, brought this issue to a head. As a result of this major cheating incident, Superintendent Admiral Fullam ordered all secret honor committees to be disbanded. 15By attempting to establish an official standardized honor system in 1950, Admiral Hill was trying to avoid this problem in a way that was consistent with a viewpoint held by Admiral Boorda over forty years later. 

• Supervision and the setting of high standards are the tasks of the leadership of the Academy and cannot be delegated to permit midshipmen to "learn by doing." 16 

After more than a year working with the midshipmen, Admiral Hill officially established the honor system at the Naval Academy. The entire written description of the system took up just one page of the Naval Academy Regulations. What they created was a body of committees composed of class officers and representatives who were elected by the Brigade. There was no discussion of the specific behavior that constituted an honor offense; the phrase "moral turpitude" was the only written reference. 17 Perot stated that he does not recall there being anyone who disagreed with the proposed system when taken to a Brigade-wide vote. 18 It is interesting to note that the term "Honor Concept" was not actually used until several years after the system was created as a means of trying to distinguish it as a non-codified approach. Also interesting is that to this day Perot refers to the Naval Academy's honor system as “the honor code.” 19

Since the establishment of the honor system in 1951, the ideas of non-codification, midshipman ownership, and avoiding fear-based compliance have been known. However, it was only under the leadership of Admiral Hill that these ideas were actually put into practice in any meaningful way. Soon after Admiral Hill left the Naval Academy in 1952 and the group of midshipmen who helped create the honor system had graduated, the system began moving away from its original intent and towards what its creators had tried to avoid. By the late 1960s defined honor violations had been added to the instruction governing the honor system, which by then totaled more than 30 pages. Officers had been assigned to directly oversee the day-to-day operation of the system, and most of the written discussion of honor emphasized that if a midshipman committed an honor offense he would be separated from the Naval Academy. 20

The 1970s saw the Honor Concept begin to encompass both the procedural instruction and the statement "A midshipman does not lie, cheat, or steal" 21 (nearly verbatim with the Military Academy's Honor Code, "A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do"). 22 The only substantial difference between the two academies’ definitions was a "non-toleration clause" in West Point's Honor Code. (This clause requires cadets to report honor offenses, or else they become guilty of one as well.) Admiral Hill specifically did not want to incorporate this policy at the Naval Academy because he thought it would relieve the midshipmen of an innate sense of responsibility to do the right thing in enforcing high standards of honor. It also forced individuals to take action in order to avoid punishment, an approach Admiral Hill was against. 23 The absence of the "non-toleration clause" became the perceived, primary difference between an "Honor Concept" and "Honor Code," a perception that persists today. Unfortunately, not only is this fundamentally false, it also causes the Naval Academy's Honor System, and thus the Naval Academy, to appear to take standards of honor less seriously than the other service academies, as the requirements and expectations of midshipmen appear less stringent. In addition, this period also saw the definitions of honor offenses become more detailed, and the committee structure began to lose its significance. 24

By the end of the 1980s, the Honor Concept had changed to "Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They do not lie, cheat, or steal," most likely because the previous version sounded too much like West Point's Honor Code, and thus was not consistent with a concept-based approach. 25 The Brigade's attitude toward the honor system was apparently very negative at this point. Most education efforts centered on administrative procedures and possible punishments for committing honor violations.

As a result of the 1992 Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident the Honor Concept statement was modified and expanded to its present form. The Armitage Report also recommended that a group of midshipmen write a treatise that focused on the positive aspects of honorable conduct. 26 The Honor Treatise was written in 1994.

In 2005, the committee structure was completely abandoned. The current "honor staff" is a subcomponent of the regular Brigade organization, and honor staff members are selected by a panel of senior officers at the Naval Academy. 27 It must be noted that few, if any, midshipmen have had a “say” in the changes that have been made to the system over the years— a system which was originally created by midshipmen and enacted by a nearly unanimous Brigade-wide vote.

Nonetheless, since the system was established in 1951, each new class of midshipmen has been taught that the Naval Academy has a non-codified, or concept-based, standard of honor despite the system’s actual structure. There is still regular discussion and proclamation that the Brigade "owns" the Honor Concept (sometimes meaning both the statement and the system, depending on whom you talk to), despite the fact that: 1) the Brigade plays no role whatsoever in the selection of honor staff members, and 2) the selected staff members report directly to the Honor Officer, who is a member of the Department of Character Development and Training Division under the Commandant. This is a far cry indeed from the original structure, which on occasion saw the First Class Committee Chairman, who was the midshipman responsible for overseeing the system, report directly to the Superintendent. 28

While the system has undergone drastic changes throughout the past 60 years, the description and discussion of it have remained basically unchanged. Due to the inconsistency between how the system was understood and how it actually operated, midshipmen, alumni, faculty members, and staff officers have little confidence in the effectiveness of the current program.

The system is claimed to be non-codified, yet definitions remain; it is claimed to not be based on fear, yet its only function is to punish (although I am unaware of any midshipmen who were separated solely due to an honor offense in the last four years); it is claimed to be owned and operated by the Brigade, yet the Brigade has no “say” in the selection of staff members, nor do those staff members have any real authority over the system, other than the execution of documented procedures and orders from the staff officers assigned over them.

The establishment of the remediation program after the Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident with no modification of the message that midshipmen who commit honor offenses will be separated only aggravated the situation. It cannot be claimed that the use of separation by a system aimed at growth and development is beneficial for the individual who comes into contact with the system. The dilemma midshipmen faced in 1992 was that if they exercised the moral courage to tell the truth as a good naval officer should, they would lose any possibility of ever becoming a naval officer. 29 If the Honor Concept is truly aimed at development, as it is claimed to be, then remediation can be the only justifiable response to an honor offense.

This acknowledgement however, would have to be accompanied by some significant changes at the Academy if remediation were to ever take on its full role. The current perception of the program is that it has little effect on character development and it allows individuals with integrity issues to become officers. Any negative attitude toward the effectiveness or value of remediation undermines its ability to fully remediate midshipmen in the program. If midshipmen in remediation feel ostracized by the Academy community as a whole, little progress can be made in addressing their character issues.

Of course, midshipmen who fail to live up to the Navy’s standards of honor and personal integrity should not be allowed to graduate. However, it would be irresponsible to the American taxpayers who have already invested in every midshipman, to the Navy which is in constant need of quality officers, and to the individual who was admitted by the Academy in the first place, if a concerted remediation effort was not at least attempted before separation for an honor offense. At the same time, retaining individuals who clearly are not capable of successfully completing the remediation process undermines its legitimacy.

The contradiction between expending legitimate efforts to reform an individual through remediation and claiming that violators will be separated from the Academy leaves officials with no consistent framework for decision making. This also propagates the perception of hypocrisy throughout the Naval Academy community since the Administration does not appear to follow the policies concerning separation, policies which it disseminates. Remediation is truly a positive and necessary step in the direction of actual development efforts, and yet its potential for success is constantly undermined by the prevailing attitude towards it.

As long as the inconsistencies described above are allowed to exist, it remains practically impossible to address any issues afflicting the honor system. Since the same terminology (concept, ownership, etc.) has been used for the past six decades, officers, midshipmen, and alumni who attempt to discuss these issues are not aware that they very well may be talking about different things. For example, it took me nearly four years to completely piece together the evolution of the honor system from its creation in 1951 to what exists today. The confusing language and recycled terminology has made work on this program convoluted and tedious at best. The current honor system at the Naval Academy is inconsistent, ineffective, contradictory, misunderstood, and confusing, and has little support from the Naval Academy community as a whole.

The problem with implementing a codified approach like that found at West Point or the Air Force Academy is that Admiral Hill correctly identified the problems that would arise if a codified approach were implemented. Since the Naval Academy codified its honor system in the late 1960s, individuals accused of committing honor offenses have regularly resorted to explaining how their actions did not fit the definitions. In addition, the fear of separation did more to cause the 1992 Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident than to deter it. 30 Probably most unsettling, however, is that a 2004 study by Timothy Clark, a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, found the Honor Concept to be one of the most negative influences on the moral development of midshipmen at the Naval Academy. 31 This alone invalidates any claim that midshipmen “own” the Honor Concept. If similar studies were to be conducted at West Point and the Air Force Academy, the results would most likely reveal that their Honor Codes, while seemingly more successful in regulating behavior, are not very effective at truly developing strong moral and ethical values in the student body.

Meanwhile, all of this does not mean that the original honor system established by Admiral Hill should be re-instituted, or that the process he used to create it should be repeated. The lack of formalized guidance in the original system (the entire write-up being only one page) seems to have been compensated for by the personal efforts of Admiral Hill himself. 32 For example, he frequently spoke directly to the Brigade on the importance of honor and personal integrity. Without his personal involvement after his departure from the Naval Academy, the system was not able to function effectively, and thus the door was opened to allow the modifications that have led to what exists today. 33

The main issue here, of which Admiral Hill was clearly aware, is that while policies and rules are effective for regulating certain types of behavior, they offer very little towards teaching or developing individual character. While it is true that individuals who report to the Academy with a solid foundation of basic principles may be able to function under a codified honor system, for those who did not receive such an upbringing, a stringent and punitive system does more harm than good. If history teaches us anything, it is that no matter how much the Brigade is regulated, if there is not a concerted effort to guide and mentor the midshipmen, no amount of rules or punishments are ever going to turn them into leaders with strong moral character.   

Historical Lessons in Leading Midshipmen 

Throughout its history, the Naval Academy has faced a wide range of challenges with respect to the behavior and conduct of midshipmen. In every case, however, the response of Academy officials was based on either of the following two approaches: 1) strict discipline and punishment, or 2) intellectual and rational appeal based on mutual respect.

I am not implying that the second approach lacked discipline or that the consequences for unacceptable behavior were not appropriate. What I mean is that the process for going about addressing a particular issue was not one based solely on punishment or strict adherence to punitive regulations and policies. Instead, the most successful approaches to redirecting the conduct of midshipmen and influencing their characters have been those that sought to address the causes of the problems in the first place.

When Admiral Porter took over as Superintendent in 1865, the Naval Academy was not in good shape. The Civil War had left the Academy grounds in shambles, the morale of the midshipmen was low, and the standards of performance and conduct were even lower. Midshipmen frequently sneaked into town and embarrassed themselves and the Naval Academy in public displays of drunkenness. 34 While most of his contemporaries would have harshly punished such deplorable behavior, Admiral Porter took the opposite approach. He said:  

• It has been my endeavor to promote the amusement of the midshipmen within the grounds, so that they would have no desire to go outside the academy limits. I am pleased to say that my efforts in this direction have met with great success (at least in my opinion), and there seems to be but little disposition to go outside the walls to seek amusement, or to indulge in vicious habits...everything in reason is done to make them happy and contented. 35

Park Benjamin, who had been a midshipman under Admiral Porter's command, wrote, "Porter recognized that the midshipmen were human beings, and young ones at that." He encouraged midshipmen to participate in sports, musical and theatrical pursuits, sailing, and even arranged for weekly dances to be held on Academy grounds. 36 Interestingly, this approach by Admiral Porter in the 1860s seems consistent with a statement made by Admiral Boorda in 1990. 

• The four years at the Naval Academy must be enjoyable, even fun. The experience should be one of enrichment and growth. It must not be sheer drudgery and total discipline to the exclusion of humanistic pursuits and the joy one should experience as one matures. 37

Similarly, Timothy Clark's 2004 study about the influences of moral development at the Naval Academy revealed the following: 

• Most midshipmen believe that sports force them to make sure they are doing the right thing. For this reason they believe their participation in sports at the Naval Academy has a positive impact on their moral development. 38

Surely, Admiral Porter must have had some inkling of this idea when he climbed onto the gymnastics equipment himself, or even donned boxing gloves and entered the ring with a midshipman to encourage participation in such activities. 39 This is not to say, however, that he was lenient in any way with regard to discipline or standards of performance. Benjamin wrote the following: 

• His first orders to the Commandant and Academic Board [directed them to "begin the weeding process at once," and to "report all those who in their estimation will be a discredit to the Academy." The reported ones departed; and the protests of their friends and congressmen availed them naught. 40

Admiral Porter also placed the midshipmen on their honor to follow the Naval Academy Regulations and did not subject them to any of what he referred to as "espionage" by Academy officials. 41 Benjamin wrote about what Admiral Porter told the midshipmen: “Their words would be implicitly accepted as truth; that they would be called upon to do their duty as it was pointed out to them, not because military discipline forced them to do it, but because such was the honorable and proper course in view of the obligations which they were under to the Government which was educating and supporting them.”42 This is an example of what I referred to before as intellectual and rational appeal. In defense of this approach, Admiral Porter wrote, "If they do not act honorably under the present system, it is scarcely worthwhile to expect it under any other." 43 Among his other contributions to the Naval Academy, Admiral Porter revised the curriculum to incorporate courses such as astronomy, mechanics, physics, moral science, constitutional law, geometry, and calculus. 44

There is little doubt that Admiral Porter played a significant role in laying the foundation for what the Academy was to become, and that his efforts were successful seems quite apparent. In his report to President Johnson in 1867, Admiral Porter stated that he believed there was "a high sense of honor growing up among [the midshipmen," and that "they commit less wrong than any other equal number of young men in the country."45 Benjamin wrote glowingly about Admiral Porter's approach and the quality example he set. In addition, the Board of Visitors, a panel responsible to the president for annually inspecting the effectiveness of the Naval Academy, wrote the following about Admiral Porter: 

His remarkable energy, industry, and vitality spread like inspiration among both  officers and pupils, rousing and impelling them with a kindred zeal and a common  purpose…it is equally rare that any country can call to this peerless task one who from  his own experience can enforce his teachings with the splendors of historic achievement  and challenge the aspiration of his pupils to no higher standard than his own example. 46

Admiral Hill’s approach was very similar to that of Admiral Porter, who preceded Admiral Hill by almost a century. In a letter to Midshipman Perot, Admiral Hill wrote that while serving as a Battalion Officer in the 1930s, he was “astounded at the low standards—or lack of standards" regarding doping. 47 When Admiral Hill took command of the Naval Academy in 1950, doping was still a common practice throughout the Brigade. 48 Like Admiral Porter, Admiral Hill did not resort to strict rules or harsh punishments to abolish this practice. Instead, he set out to work with the Brigade leadership to try to "build up a sense of pride in the Brigade Organization on the part of every midshipman."49 Perot wrote of Admiral Hill's interaction with the midshipmen: “He was constantly meeting and talking with the midshipmen and seemed determined to know us all. Admiral Hill was well thought of throughout the Brigade, and in short, he was the kind of man that could make the midshipmen want to abolish the ‘dope system’ and the generally easy standards of morals that then existed...”50

In a speech to the Brigade about the importance of honor and personal integrity, Admiral Hill announced that if an honor system was unanimously accepted by the Brigade, he would no longer require professors to be present in examination rooms. 51 Not only did this legitimize the efforts to create an honor system, it is yet another example of the Superintendent placing trust in the midshipmen to conduct themselves unsupervised in accordance with Academy regulations. It is also clear that Admiral Hill had a unique stance on the importance of directly addressing the Brigade about honor. In his memoirs, Vice Admiral Lawrence gives us an idea of how Admiral Hill’s predecessors approached the topic of honor with the midshipmen: 

• During my first year, little was said about honor and integrity. The leadership at the school, from the Superintendent down, probably figured these qualities were so thoroughly ingrained in the ethic of the naval service that there was really no great need to discuss them. Perhaps, through a kind of osmosis, midshipmen in their daily observation of senior officers would automatically acquire what the father of the U.S. Navy, John Paul Jones, called "that nicest sense of personal honor." 52

That Admiral Hill did not want to leave the moral development of the midshipmen up to "osmosis" is clear. He spoke directly to the Brigade on several occasions concerning the importance of honor and moral courage in combat; the significance of a person's signature, and the necessity that midshipmen not only live up to but also enforce such standards of conduct. 53 As mentioned earlier, Admiral Porter also discussed these issues directly with the midshipmen in the 1860s. It should come as no surprise then that we see this idea again in 1990 when Admiral Boorda emphasized the significance of directly addressing honor, writing: “A restatement of basic principles, a focus on the true mission, and an improved communication of these essential elements can and will improve the day-to-day operation of the Naval Academy and will result in a more effective and efficient attainment of the institution's goal.” 54 Surely we can see the accuracy of this prediction in the context of Admiral Hill’s and Admiral Porter’s successes. Unfortunately though, there is very little on this topic that is being effectively communicated at the Naval Academy today.

Like Admiral Porter before him, Admiral Hill was by no means lax when it came to rules or regulations. Soon after taking command, and much to the dismay of the First Class, Admiral Hill reversed many of the privileges that had been granted by his predecessor, such as possession of civilian clothes in Bancroft Hall or being granted more than two "off duty weekends" per semester. 55

The following two statements, written by individuals who served under either Porter or Hill, further emphasize the similarities between them.

• Never had the discipline been better (hazing was unknown), never had the students been more diligent or imbued with a higher sense of personal honor and duty, and never had the Academy graduated larger or more intelligent classes; and all of this was due, and solely due, to Porter's wise and excellent government. 56
• His leadership and inspiration caused the Brigade to raise their standards. His influence on the Academy and especially on the midshipmen will not soon be forgotten, and his rare quality of leading by outstanding example is a goal for us all to strive for. The establishment of the Honor Committees is a tangible proof of the tremendous influence that Admiral Hill exerted over the Brigade, not by Executive Order, but by personal example. 57

While there were likely to be as many different opinions as there were midshipmen, the influence and impact of these two superintendents cannot be ignored.

Another factor in the apparent success of these two superintendents was their willingness to work with others. As stated earlier, Admiral Hill sought the input and ideas from officers and midshipmen alike when confronting the problems of his day. Likewise, Benjamin wrote that many of Admiral Porter’s reforms "were undertaken more in reliance upon the opinions of others than upon definite convictions of his own." 58 "Listening to your people" is an important quality of effective leadership, and indeed, here we have two real cases in which the results of such actions produced a lasting impact.

Along these lines, the importance that individuals assigned to the Naval Academy are able to set good examples for the midshipmen cannot be overstated. The 1993 Armitage Report review panel recognized this when making its recommendations: 

• Recommendation 2: Detail only the most exceptional Navy and Marine Corps officers, both junior and senior, to Naval Academy billets...Rate all such officers in the top one percent (1%) of their peer group without ranking. 59

In 2004, Clark concluded that good examples set by officers are among the most significant influences on the moral development of midshipmen: 

• Most midshipmen value the presence of moral superiors around them. Their example inspires the midshipmen to try to make moral decisions and to behave morally...For many midshipmen, seeing morally sound behavior in their seniors inspires morally sound behavior in them. Morally sound decisions and actions create a desire in many midshipmen to emulate the examples they see. 60 

In regard to the specific performance and abilities of the officers at the Naval Academy, we also see very significant effects on the midshipmen. For example, Benjamin described the officers that were assigned to the Naval Academy during Admiral Porter's command as: 

• ...one of the most brilliant groups of young officers which had ever been assembled under the auspices of the Navy...men who had actively fought the battles of the Civil War and who had now returned, flushed with the enthusiasms of victory, and ready to bend all their energies to teaching the rising generation how to go and do likewise. 61

The above description indicates that those officers were both technically proficient and excited to work with the midshipmen. Again in 1993, the Armitage Report concluded that this combination is essential for effectively developing midshipmen. 62 In contrast, one letter from the early 1900s, written by an Academy alumnus 40 years after graduating, indicated the potential effects of assigning to the Naval Academy a different caliber of officer than that described above. 

• ...many of the officers ordered to duty at the Academy were professionally unfitted for such an assignment and, by reason of their personalities, personal conduct and bad example in the performance of their duties, offered an open challenge to midshipmen so disposed to try to outsmart them and, deliberately, to violate regulations and orders. 63

Not only do the kinds of officers described above detract from the moral development of midshipmen, they actually incite bad behavior and poor conduct.

The prevalence throughout Academy history of the idea that setting good examples is critical for developing midshipmen indicates that it could quite possibly be the single most important component for producing high quality and effective officers. Therefore, Academy leadership, staff officers, company officers, senior enlisted leaders, and professors should treat every interaction with midshipmen as an opportunity to teach them, guide them, and show them the proper way to conduct themselves.  Midshipmen are future military officers and should be treated at all times with that end in mind.

The current widespread problem of cynicism at the Academy is an indication of a failure to do this. I often wondered, What legitimate reason does the Naval Academy midshipman have to be cynical? The quality of education is high and is provided at no cost to the midshipman. The opportunities available to each member of the Brigade far surpass those available to any comparable undergraduate student in the country, including cadets at West Point and the Air Force Academy who have fewer options for service assignments.

It is difficult to believe, as it is oftentimes claimed, that trivialities such as limited weekend liberty or regulated exercise uniforms are the main causes of cynicism. The average midshipman is not, and has never been, adverse to hard or challenging work. In fact, this is what typically attracts him or her to the Academy in the first place. Something is driving midshipmen to acquire cynical attitudes towards the Naval Academy. Unfortunately, cynicism is not new to the shores of the Severn. We can see its effects throughout Academy history and it appears to result more from the environment than from any intrinsic laziness or maliciousness on the part of the midshipmen.

In the early 1870s, due to factors affecting the entire Navy, the midshipmen's prospects for advancement were low. Despite completion of the Naval Academy curriculum, there was no guarantee a graduating midshipman would be promoted to the rank of Ensign. 64 Not so coincidentally, the first instances of hazing committed at the Naval Academy occurred in 1871. 65

Perot cites another time, just after World War I, when outside influences had a negative effect on the Naval Academy: 

• Many young men were there, as in the last war, who had no great desire to stay in the service and therefore had no desire to maintain the high standards of conduct which the service requires. During the 1920s matters got progressively worse and gouging was a subject which was openly discussed and full knowledge of it was had by many classmates of the offenders. 66

In regard to the first hazing incident in 1871, 11 midshipmen were dismissed as a result of their involvement. 67 Nevertheless, the problem persisted and shortly thereafter the "hazing law" was passed.  The law "made every form of hazing, however trivial or absurd, a courts-martial offense." 68 The effects of this law were far reaching, but not in the manner intended by its authors. In many instances, acts of hazing included such harmless conduct that the "victims" often drew as much amusement from the hazing as those administering it. Benjamin wrote the following about a particular outbreak of hazing that occurred in 1883: 

• It was evident from the outset that nobody had been maltreated in any way involving peril to life or limb...Try as they might to be becomingly grave, the members of the court were in a perpetual state of subdued laughter. 69 

Even so, any midshipman found to have been involved in the administering of such practices was dismissed from the Naval Academy, with no chance of ever being readmitted. Eventually, midshipmen began to perceive the law as unfair and the consequences unjust. The results were detrimental to the standards that Admiral Porter had worked so hard to establish. 

• The "hazing law" required the student to testify against himself and his comrades through “fear and duress." 70
• If, to save a friend from peremptory dismissal, a lie was necessary, that lie was told...Not that the youngsters deliberately chose a dishonorable course. On the contrary, from their point of view, they regarded their action as the most honorable possible. The victims of hazing would as readily deny its existence as the perpetrators themselves. 71

      This same situation led to the development of an adversarial relationship between officers and midshipmen on several occasions throughout Naval Academy history. In such environments where the interactions between Academy officials and the Brigade are not marked by mutual respect and trust, standards deteriorate and cynicism spreads. Evidence of this is present in the early 1900s from the letters written to Perot. 

• [The Discipline Officer openly declared that all cadets were sneaks and liars and that they had to be handled accordingly. 72
• Many of the officers of the Discipline Department (and I do mean "Discipline Department") did more to incite misbehavior on the part of the midshipmen than they did to discourage and restrain it. Official relations between the midshipmen and the officers of the Discipline Department were marked by mutual distrust and hostility. 73
• ...I feel quite sure that the temptations of misconduct were much greater 50 years ago. We were almost as closely confined and vigilantly watched as prisoners in a penitentiary. 74

      The Class banded together and protected its members in minor misdemeanors and venial  sins. 75

Midshipmen seldom informed on each other, especially classmates... 76

These letters certainly indicate an atmosphere at the Naval Academy that was quite different from the atmosphere during the administrations of Admiral Hill and Admiral Porter.

 The 1993 Armitage Report comments on how a similar situation contributed to the Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident that occurred in 1992: 

• ...Negative leadership in the form of meaningless harassment, degradation, and condescension, created an "us versus them" or "cops and robbers" mindset that subjugated institutional loyalty and professional collegiality to an unhealthy distortion of the proscription "don't bilge your classmate." 77

Unfortunately, there was little evidence of improvement in light of Clark’s findings in 2004: 

• Feeling like the Naval Academy is an "us [midshipmen versus them [administration" fight, midshipmen struggle with moral courage. Many midshipmen believe their responsibility is to their classmates. 78

Time and again, we see the same problems ineffectively handled in the same ways. In almost every documented case where strict punishments and fear were used in an attempt to raise standards, the attempt failed. Numerous independent sources, spanning over 140 years, come to the same conclusions about the shortcomings of such efforts. In 1882, we see the sentiments of the father of a midshipman who had been dismissed in accordance with the "hazing law": 

• ...the only means employed at Annapolis, either for curing evil habits, or leading our sons on the road to goodness and keeping them there, is Punishment! 79
• Why does [the Naval Academy not try, by regular lessons and lectures on morality or character, to eradicate the evil tendencies in the boys and lead them by the hand of encouragement and love on the road to goodness! No, he says, we have the law, and by the law they shall abide. As if the law had ever made man good! Lying, drinking, stealing, false swearing, murder are rampant in the world in spite of the severest penalties. But men of good morality hardly ever come in conflict with the law. 80 

Admiral Porter and Admiral Hill have already shown the effectiveness of “regular lessons and lectures on morality or character.”  In the context of hazing specifically, we see similar success under the command of Captain Phythian, who became Superintendent of the Naval Academy in 1890. Benjamin wrote:

• His methods were simple and kindly. They involved mainly appeals to the sense of fairness of the boys...They were extremely effective. They apparently worked better to restore the healthy moral tone of the institution and to the discountenance mischievous hazing than all the drastic measures which had hitherto been devised. 81

These same thoughts survive to the present day, as seen in the 1993 Armitage Report and Clark's 2004 study: 

• When midshipmen adopt and internalize the honor ethos, it must not be solely for fear of punishment, but because they aspire without reservation to the right course of action. 82
• The Naval Academy has in recent times viewed the Honor Concept more as a punitive process than an aspirational ideal. 83
• Most midshipmen believe that the honor board is merely a way of getting expelled from the Naval Academy. 84
• Many midshipmen also see the concept as intensely negative...midshipmen believe in the end, the system is designed to seek violators and then separate them. 85

The apparent timelessness and prevalence of not using punishment for setting and maintaining standards indicate that the approach must have some credibility.

If we look at the role of discipline, in and of itself, we recognize it as an important and integral component of the military organization, as long as it is used appropriately. Probably the best explanation of its purpose and proper means of implementation is found in a book written about the Naval Academy by the Head of the Department of Ordinance and Gunnery in 1917: 

• The discipline of the Naval Academy well illustrates the principle that in every community discipline means simply organized living…Persons who will not live right must be compelled to do so, and upon such misguided individuals there must be placed restraints. To these alone is discipline ever harsh or a form of punishment.
• This discipline is not harsh or hard nor are undue restrictions of any kind placed on the midshipmen. Discipline consists only in the regulating of the conduct and the daily routine of the life of the members of the regiment, to the end that the maximum results mentally, physically, and morally may be attained, and that all may share alike in their opportunities both for work and for play. Regulations and orders, therefore, take the form more of guides to procedure than the assignment of punishment for the infraction of proper conduct or misdemeanors.
• As before stated there are no unnecessary regulations, there is a good and sufficient reason for all, and furthermore there is no endeavor made to hide this reason. On the contrary the regiment is taken into the secret, if there be one, as to the whys and wherefores of all rules made and enforced. 86

Regardless of whether this book describes how the Naval Academy actually operated in 1917 or whether it is another example of using inconsistent language to describe Academy policies, the explanation does imply that, at some point, someone must have known that such an approach was effective. In addition, the author suggests in his reference to mental, physical, and moral results, that even the disciplinary efforts are geared to supporting the Naval Academy’s mission. This particular officer's claim that there are no "undue restrictions" and that midshipmen are informed of the purpose of regulations and policies certainly contrasts with the actual practices at the Naval Academy both before and after the time that he wrote it.

In 1877, the "misdemeanor book," equivalent to today's Conduct Manual, provided "a list of not only every possible infraction of regulations, but of all the various pranks which a youngster can commit.” It continues:  

• The somewhat unexpected effect of their effort was that the latter-day youngster thought that he had only to make up his mind as to what he wanted to do, look in the misdemeanor book and see what it would cost, and then, in view of all the provocatory circumstances, determine whether it would pay to do it. 87

Nearly identical findings are gleaned from Clark’s recent study: 

• Cutting corners and deciding which rules are important is seen as a necessity, rather than proper moral behavior. Many midshipmen reduce this idea to "calculated risks." Another midshipmen remarked: “What you learn at the Academy is how to take calculated risks and that's because we have so many rules and so many things that it doesn't necessarily always come down to whether following the rule or doing something right or doing something incorrectly is a moral decision as much as what's the end result and that's what those calculated risks are.” 88

Implementing this sort of discipline approach seems to produce consistent results. This approach is apparently most deliberately applied when the midshipmen's standards of conduct are the lowest. However, as Perot also noticed, these lulls in maintaining high standards can often be attributed to deeper underlying issues rather than just to deliberate misconduct. Therefore, such superficial disciplinary action has little hope of success because it addresses only the symptoms, and not the underlying cause, of the real problem.

It is during these lulls that effective leadership is most needed from Academy officials. It is well known that the appeal of military service and the apparent need for a strong fighting force will vary from time to time, as seen throughout our nation’s history. The actual need, however, for an effective military, led by high quality officers, will remain constant, and the trend of the times can never be allowed to dictate the Naval Academy's ability to meet that need.

The Academy consistently produces good officers, as evidenced by history. However, there is no doubt that the moral development process currently employed at the Naval Academy needs improvement. A question often raised in regard to the service academies is: "Are good leaders produced by the Academy experience, or are they merely attracted to the institution?" Surely, the answer to this question is both. The young people who apply to these esteemed institutions possess leadership potential, and the Naval Academy plays an integral role in the development of this potential. The challenge, then, is to ensure that the Academy’s role in the process is both significant and more than adequately executed.  

Righting the Ship 

This section describes some of the changes that I, with the help of a few others, tried to bring about during my time as a midshipman. We used Admiral Hill's philosophy, as documented by Midshipman Perot, as our starting point. Admiral Hill’s concerns that codification would make the honor system vulnerable to loopholes, that fear-based compliance would undermine the intent of an honor system, and that a lack of Brigade involvement would render the system practically useless seemed almost prophetic to us as we observed the current state of honor at the Academy.

Our goal was to come up with a process that would both create an effective and practical system for maintaining high standards of honor and personal integrity, and cause each member of the Brigade to feel personally responsible for the system.

We first studied every previous honor system that had been implemented at the Naval Academy and identified what we considered to be the best parts of each. We then combined these elements into a preliminary model of a new honor system. Next, we arranged for the election of one midshipman from each class in each company, 120 in all. These individuals, referred to as Revision Representatives, were to act as liaisons between us and their company, as well as assist in the design of the new system. This ensured that we would receive input from the entire Brigade and keep the Brigade informed about the status of the revision efforts. After the Revision Representatives reached a general consensus about how the new system would be structured, the next step was to get the Commandant’s approval of the system. At this time, we also presented the revisions to members of the faculty because, while the system needed to be designed by midshipmen for the sake of ownership, without support from the rest of the Naval Academy community, any eventual changes would be meaningless. This also enabled us to gather different ideas and perspectives that could be used to strengthen the new system. The final proposal was then taken back to the Brigade, as had been done in 1951, to vote on whether or not to accept it.

The system we created did not include defined honor offenses or codification. Reported cases would go before a Brigade Honor Board, comprised of midshipmen representing a cross-section of the Brigade. Board members would listen to evidence and then vote on whether or not they believed the accused midshipman was guilty of committing a dishonorable act. The findings of the board would then be reported to the Commandant's staff, at which point remediation and any appropriate sanctions would be assigned, as necessary. To account for the potential lack of consistency that could result from a non-codified approach, we also created a midshipman honor education program to ensure that the standards would be clearly understood and known by everyone.

An added benefit of a truly non-codified system is that every decision a Brigade Honor Board makes indicates to the Commandant where the Brigade actually stands in regard to moral and ethical standards. When a midshipman is told to vote "in violation" or "not in violation," based on a prescribed set of defined honor offenses, the vote gives no indication about how that midshipman actually feels about the actions of the accused individual. Under the proposed system, if that same midshipman were asked to vote on whether he or she thinks the actions of the accused individual were dishonorable, a great deal can be learned from the vote. By having a representative cross-section of the Brigade vote on each case, the Commandant can then make a valid assessment of where education efforts should be focused. By not codifying the standards, we essentially created a closed feedback loop for continuous solidification of the standards through deliberate and coordinated education efforts.

We also removed any midshipmen from the role of assigning remediation or sanctions for honor offenses. Such a role for midshipmen was seen as a superficial attempt to increase a sense of midshipman ownership, and did more to undermine the basic military structure of the Naval Academy than anything else. This was never clearer to me than when I observed a decorated Marine Corps Major, in accordance with the current system, stand up and give his recommendation in an honor adjudication to a First Class Midshipman who was presiding over the hearing. It was as if the midshipman somehow possessed the authority and experience to legitimately make a decision that potentially could have gone against the Major's recommendation! Not only that, but the individual being adjudicated could have been separated based on the decision of the presiding midshipman. Throughout the 160 years of Naval Academy history that led up to this change in 2005, no midshipman has ever had official authority to assign sanctions for an honor offense, and this seemed appropriate.

In addition to the substantial procedural changes, we also resolved the confusing and inconsistent language that had been plaguing the system for decades. Most important, however, we acknowledged that our system was not going to be perfect. Thus, we included guidelines for a compulsory annual review process that would be open to the entire Brigade and that ensured that any changes required to update or improve the system could be easily made in the future. We believed that such a process would not only allow the system to improve every year, but it would also help to maintain a strong sense of Brigade ownership and involvement.

In the 1950s, the original system included a brief description of how changes would be made, but there is no indication that this process was ever used (or even acknowledged for that matter). 89 The revision process was clearly not included in even one of the 15 or so revised honor instructions that followed it. It was as if each successive instruction was assumed to be the perfect final system.

In essence, what we were attempting to create was a program that captured the spirit of Admiral Hill's leadership and applied it in a practical and sustainable way. If there was one takeaway from all of our work, however, it was that fixing these problems was never a matter of creating the perfect honor system. Of course, if the administrative aspects are inefficient and confusing the system cannot properly carry out its role in support of the Naval Academy’s moral development mission. But if instilling strong ethical values in midshipmen was ever truly dependent on the perfect administrative policy, Admiral Hill would not have left its design up to the Brigade. Instead, he would have assigned the task to experienced and knowledgeable professionals. The fact of the matter is the entire success of moral development at the Naval Academy hinges on the quality leadership of Academy officials and their willingness to work with the midshipmen. This has been true ever since George Bancroft founded the Naval Boat School in Annapolis, on October 10, 1845, and it will remain true as long as the Naval Academy gates remain open.

Unfortunately, since the original honor system was established in 1951, generations of graduates have come to believe that as long as the administrative process was intact, the system was contributing to the moral development of midshipmen. Due to this misunderstanding, the Naval Academy does not treat the honor system as a mechanism for moral development. We saw this during last year’s revision efforts, undertaken between January and April, which were essentially ignored by the Brigade. When the final proposal was taken to a Brigade-wide vote, however, it received over 60% approval. This approval primarily resulted from one statement in support of the changes made by the Commandant the night before the vote was conducted. One can imagine the level of support our efforts could have received if more attention had been given to the process from the beginning. This is not to lay blame for the failure of the revision efforts, but instead, point out the significant influence of Academy officials on the attitudes of the Brigade. Since graduating in May, I understand that hardly any progress has been made beyond what we accomplished between January and April. At the same time, as disappointing as it was, our failure was not unanticipated.

Every semester that I was at the Naval Academy, and probably for dozens of semesters before that, each new honor staff (or committee) that took office began by proclaiming that it was going to fix the apparent problems and issues with the honor system. No doubt their efforts were greatly hindered by the language issues I mentioned earlier, and not surprisingly, their proclamations hardly ever resulted in any substantial or meaningful changes. Therefore, it is not impossible for me to believe that our claim to provide real solutions did not carry much weight with the midshipmen, faculty, or Administration. That we were able to accomplish as much as we did in so short a time is a testament to the viability of our approach.

Regardless, the state of the honor system at the Naval Academy, and thus the state of honor, is relatively unchanged from what it was before the work described above was conducted. The problems I have mentioned are real, and they are having a detrimental effect on the Naval Academy as a whole. We cannot afford to allow this situation to persist unabated due to mere ignorance and neglect. As Admiral Boorda wrote just before the 1992 Electrical Engineering Cheating Incident, 

We, as a society, make the heavy investment in these time-honored institutions mainly  because we recognize and embrace their capabilities in character building. Unless these  institutions prove themselves crucibles of leadership that can add a special ingredient to  our armed forces, the rationale for their continued existence will be called into question. 90

If any progress is to be made, the Academy leadership must make it clear to the Brigade in a visible and substantial way that the issues of honor and personal integrity take highest priority.  The methods by which moral and ethical values are instilled in the midshipmen must be clearly understood and agreed upon by everyone assigned to the Naval Academy. The midshipmen must be given a meaningful role in establishing and upholding the Naval Academy’s standards of honor, and they must be guided by active mentorship not driven by fear.  

Without a doubt, the issue of moral development is the biggest challenge facing the Naval Academy today. Until the Administration, Faculty, and Brigade begin to collaborate in this endeavor, no significant improvements can be made in regard to fulfilling the Naval Academy's purpose of providing this nation with leaders of strong moral character.

REFERENCES

[1 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen-USNA Instruction 1610.3G (2005), 23.

[2 Harry W. Hill to H. Ross Perot, February 11, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz LIbrary Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[3 William P. Lawrence and Rosario Rausa, Tennessee Patriot: The Naval Career of Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 16-17.

[4 Henry R. Perot, A Report on the Brigade Executive Committee and Class Honor Committees at the United States Naval Academy, report (1953), pg. 2.

[5 Jeremy M. Boorda, Report of the Informal Review Board on the Honor Concept and Conduct System at the U.S. Naval Academy, report (1990), 4.

[6 Henry R. Perot, A Report on the Brigade Executive Committee and Class Honor Committees at the United States Naval Academy, 1.

[7 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding.

[8 L. M. Atkins to H. Ross Perot, February 4, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[9 R. F. Frellsen to H. Ross Perot, February 1, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[10 William Rea Furlong to H. Ross Perot, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[11 Fred E. McMillen to H. Ross Perot, February 6, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[12 R. E. P. Elmer to H. Ross Perot, March 13, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[13 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, report (1993), 5.

[14 L. F. Safford to H. Ross Perot, February 10, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[15 New York Times (New York City), "President Orders Middies Dropped," August 16, 1915; New York Times (New York City), "Defense by the Middies; Issue 'a Declaration of Principles' in Connection with Gouging Scandal.," June 26, 1915.

[16 Jeremy M. Boorda, Report of the Informal Review Board on the Honor Concept and Conduct System at the U.S. Naval Academy, 4.

[17 United States Naval Academy Regulations (1951).

[18 "H. Ross Perot Interview on History of Naval Academy Honor System," interview by author, October 2008.

[19 Ibid

[20 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen (1968), 1-2.

[21 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen-USNA Instruction 1610.3B (1977), 2.

[22 "About the Academy." United States Military Academy. http://www.usma.edu/about.asp (accessed February 8, 2010).

[23 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding, 12-13.

[24 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen-USNA Instruction 1610.3B (1977), 9-11.

[25 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen-USNA Instruction 1610.3D (1989), 1.

[26Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 10.

[27 Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen-USNA Instruction 1610.3G (2005), 21.

[28 Perot, Henry R. H. Ross Perot-Forrestal Lecture Series, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, February 2000.

[29 "A Matter of Honor." In 60 Minutes. CBS. September 11, 1994.

[30 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 5.

[31 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective" (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).

[32 Henry R. Perot, A Report on the Brigade Executive Committee and Class Honor Committees at the United States Naval Academy, 4.

[33 "Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen," Shipmate, February 1968.

[34 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1900. http://books.google.com/books?id=0JgaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=naval+academy&ei=Ve1wS7eQGo6ENtnT-MYL&cd=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed February 8, 2010).

[35 Message From the President of the United States, ed. Perley Poore, 40th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Bill (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1867), 77-78, http://books.google.com/books?id=H_lGrJqqy2AC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed February 9, 2010).

[36 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[37 Jeremy M. Boorda, Report of the Informal Review Board on the Honor Concept and Conduct System at the U.S. Naval Academy, 3.

[38 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective".

[39 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[40 Ibid

[41 Message From the President of the United States, ed. Perley Poore, 40th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Bill, 77-78.

[42 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[43 Message From the President of the United States, ed. Perley Poore, 40th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Bill, 77-78.

[44 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[45 Message From the President of the United States, ed. Perley Poore, 40th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Bill, 77-78.

[46 Message From the President of the United States, ed. Perley Poore, 40th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Bill, 83-84.

[47 Harry W. Hill to H. Ross Perot, February 11, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz LIbrary Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[48 Henry R. Perot, A Report on the Brigade Executive Committee and Class Honor Committees at the United States Naval Academy, 3.

[49 Harry W. Hill to H. Ross Perot, February 11, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz LIbrary Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[50 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding, 12.

[51 "Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen," pg. #.

[52 William P. Lawrence and Rosario Rausa, Tennessee Patriot: The Naval Career of Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, U.S. Navy, 17.

[53 Henry R. Perot, A Report on the Brigade Executive Committee and Class Honor Committees at the United States Naval Academy, 4.

[54 Jeremy M. Boorda, Report of the Informal Review Board on the Honor Concept and Conduct System at the U.S. Naval Academy, 2.

[55 William P. Lawrence and Rosario Rausa, Tennessee Patriot: The Naval Career of Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, U.S. Navy, 19.

[56 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[57 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding, 15.

[58 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[59 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 7.

[60 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective".

[61 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[62 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 7.

[63 Fred E. McMillen to H. Ross Perot, February 6, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[64 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[65 Ibid

[66 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding.

[67 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[68 Ibid

[69 Ibid

[70 Ibid

[71 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[72 Fred E. McMillen to H. Ross Perot, February 6, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[73 Ibid.

[74 Ibid.

[75 L. F. Safford to H. Ross Perot, February 10, 1953, United States Naval Academy Nimitz Library Special Collections Archive, Annapolis, Maryland.

[76 Henry R. Perot, The History of Honor at the United States Naval Academy from its Founding.

[77 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 9.

[78 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective".

[79 P. W. Moeller, The Naval Academy at Annapolis and Hazing; or, The Vindication of an Honest Name (New York: Burr Printing House, 1884), 12, http://books.google.com/books?id=JEgN2-bsMiQC&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed February 9, 2010).

[80 Ibid, 13.

[81 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[82 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 4.

[83 Richard L. Armitage et al., Report of the Honor Review Committee to the Secretary of the Navy on Honor at the United States Naval Academy, 5.

[84 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective".

[85 Ibid.

[86 Earle, Ralph. Life at the United States Naval Academy: The Making of the American Naval Officer. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1917. http://books.google.com/books?id=60wYAAAAYAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed February 9, 2010).

[87 Benjamin, Park. The United States Naval Academy.

[88 Timothy M. Clark, "Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman's Perspective".

[89 Henry R. Perot,...

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